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ABSTRACT 
 
This report has summarised the work undertaken at QUT as part of a research project sponsored 
by the Federal Transit Administration in the US. The project was administered by the US 
Transportation Research Board of the National Research Council, under TCRP Project G-6: ‘A 
Guidebook for Developing a Transit Performance-Measurement System’. Kittelson and 
Associates Inc. acted as the principal investigators and other participants included Urbitran Inc., 
LKC Consulting Services, MORPACE International, Inc. and Yuko Nakanishi.  
 
The stated objective of this research is: 
 
‘to produce a practical, user-friendly guidebook that will assist transit system managers in 
developing a performance-measurement system that uses traditional and nontraditional 
performance indicators and measures to address customer-oriented and community issues.’ 
As well as an extensive literature review, a total of 19 transit planning agencies and operators 
were interviewed for the overall project, regarding the performance measures currently in use. 
The results are available in the form of several project reports, which are currently in draft form, 
including: 
 
• TCRP G-6: A guidebook for developing a transit performance measurement system: 
Literature Review, September 2001;  
• TCRP G-6: A guidebook for developing a transit performance measurement system: 
Interim Report, December 2001; and 
• TCRP G-6: A guidebook for developing a transit performance measurement system: 
Performance measure summary, December 2001. 
 
As part of the team working on the project QUT reviewed a number of existing transit 
performance based contracts in several countries. This report deals with the review of evidence 
from agencies and operators. 
The summary provided here is based on documents obtained from agencies and operators, as 
well as on personal communication with a number of individuals in 12 organisations in 
Australia, US, UK, Norway and South Africa. 
 
    Transit Contracts: Performance Measures 
    
QUT Transport Research Consortium 3 
  
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................4 
 
2. PERFORMANCE MEASURES USED: SUMMARIES ...................................................5 
 
2.1 QUEENSLAND TRANSPORT – BUSES AND FERRIES.............................................5 
2.2 QUEENSLAND TRANSPORT – RAIL...........................................................................6 
2.3 DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE, VICTORIA.................................................6 
2.4 TRANSPERTH .................................................................................................................7 
2.5 TRANSPORT, WESTERN AUSTRALIA .......................................................................8 
2.6 UITP (INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT).....................9 
2.7 REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION OF NEVADA .............................11 
2.8 STRATEGIC RAIL AUTHORITY, UK.........................................................................12 
2.9 TAS PARTNERSHIP LIMITED ....................................................................................14 
2.10 INCENTIVE CONTRACTS IN NORWEGIAN LOCAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT ....15 
2.11 KCRC (KOWLOON-CANTON RAILWAY CORPORATION).................................16 
2.12 SOUTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT................................................18 
 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS..............................................................................................20 
 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Transit Contracts: Performance Measures 
    
QUT Transport Research Consortium 4 
  
1. BACKGROUND 
 
This report provides a summary of the research undertaken by the QUT Transport Consortium in 
2001, as part of a US Academy of Sciences sponsored research project. The Transit Co-
Operative Research Project: ‘A Guidebook for Developing a Transit Performance-Measurement 
System’ was awarded to Kittelson & Associates, Inc. as lead consultants for a total of $A600 K.  
 
The stated objective of this research is: 
 
‘to produce a practical, user-friendly guidebook that will assist transit system managers in 
developing a performance-measurement system that uses traditional and nontraditional 
performance indicators and measures to address customer-oriented and community issues. The 
guidebook will provide a menu of performance indicators and measures, describe how to select 
and implement the most appropriate performance indicators and measures, and explain how to 
incorporate the indicators and measures in the decision-making process to monitor and improve 
service.’ 
As part of the team working on the project QUT reviewed a number of existing transit 
performance based contracts in several countries. In addition, a literature review was carried out 
on the use of performance measures in contracts between planning agency and transit operators. 
This report deals with the review of evidence from agencies and operators. 
The summary provided here is based on documents obtained from agencies and operators, as 
well as on personal communication with a number of individuals in some of the following 
organisations: 
 
• Queensland Transport 
• Department of Infrastructure, Victoria 
• Transperth, Western Australia  
• Department of Transport, Western Australia 
• Strategic Rail Authority, UK 
• Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC), UK 
• TAS Partnership Limited, UK  
• Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo, Norway 
• UITP (International Association of Public Transport) 
• Regional Transportation Commission (RTC) Nevada, US 
• KCRC, Hong Kong  
• South Africa Department of Transport, South Africa 
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2. PERFORMANCE MEASURES USED: SUMMARIES 
 
2.1 QUEENSLAND TRANSPORT – BUSES AND FERRIES 
Source: Personal Communication with Mr Colin Jennings, Queensland Transport, Brisbane, 
Queensland, Australia.  
 
Transit Systems:  Bus and Ferry Service Operators, all privately owned providers, with the 
exception of Brisbane Transport, which is owned and operated by the Brisbane City Council. 
 
Transit Modes Considered: Urban fixed-route bus and ferry. 
Performance Measures Identified: 
 
• Community-based:  public transport user perceptions of the service quality. 
• Transit availability: Mobility and access measures: route coverage (operators in non-
urban centres and towns have to ensure that 85% of the population within the contract 
area is within 400 metres of a bus route. In urban centres 95% of the population must be 
within 400 metres of a bus route); spread and frequency of timetabled bus hours.  
• Comfort & convenience: service quality (that is, friendliness of drivers, cleanliness of 
buses, assistance with problems/complaints, etc.). 
• Economics/productivity: patronage and farebox revenue (both collected monthly); total 
kilometres and total revenue kilometres; and costs. 
• Speed & delay:  on time running. 
 
Comments 
 
A survey is undertaken within each contract area every two and a half years, corresponding to 
the mid-term review and contract renewal periods.  This survey asks each respondent questions 
under the following broad headings: 
 
‘Use of transport’ 
• regular use of transport services 
• total use of transport services 
• frequency of bus travel 
• purpose of bus travel 
• reasons for not using the bus to travel to work 
• times of bus travel (that is, when did they travel) 
• reasons for infrequent use of bus services 
• likelihood of increased bus use. 
 
‘Public transport performance’ 
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• how well run and reliable is the bus service 
• how well co-ordinated is the bus service 
• whether or not the service met the transport need of the consumer. 
 
‘bus service performance’ 
 
• personal safety when using the bus service 
• general level of service standards 
• accessibility of bus services 
• affordability of using buses. 
‘Bus operator performance’ 
 
• how community minded is the company 
• whether the company is open to suggestions or views from consumers 
• the overall standard of the service. 
 
2.2 QUEENSLAND TRANSPORT – RAIL  
Source: Personal Communication with Mr Chris Nash, Queensland Transport, Brisbane, 
Queensland, Australia.  
 
Transit Systems:  CityTrain and TravelTrain services (QR) 
Transit Modes Considered: Commuter rail. 
Performance Measures Identified: 
 
• Community-based:  customer satisfaction survey. 
• Comfort & convenience: special services; safety and security (number of incidents 
involving passengers; number of incidents of vandalism and graffiti on train) 
• Service delivery: Reliability – the scheduled and unscheduled services that were 
cancelled (by corridor); number of services scheduled. 
• Service offered/utilization: Number of journeys (by origins, destinations, day of week, 
line section, ticket and passenger types); train kilometres (by line section); passenger 
loading factors (by corridor); Boardings and alightings (by station peak times). 
• Economics/productivity: revenue (by line section, ticket and passenger type)    
• Speed & delay: On-Time (% services within 3 min and 59 sec of scheduled arrival; by 
corridor and time of day) 
 
2.3 DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE, VICTORIA  
Source: Track Record - Quarterly Performance Bulletin, Edition 6 (January-March 2001). Department of 
Infrastructure, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, www.doi.gov.au, June 2001. Performance information 
for Victoria’s train, tram and bus services. 
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Transit Systems:  Private sector companies operating the transit in Victoria: MetroLink Pty Ltd 
(trams), Connex Trains Melbourne, National Express Group Australia (trains), National Bus 
Company, Melbourne Bus Link. 
Transit Modes Considered: Urban fixed-route bus; light rail and commuter rail. 
Performance Measures Identified:  
 
• Community-based:  Customer satisfaction – monthly surveys of users and non-users are 
conducted rating a number of aspects of transit, also complied to an overall Customer 
Satisfaction Index.  
• Service delivery: Reliability – the proportion of scheduled services that were cancelled 
[except 1 tram operator: ratio kms traveled to kms scheduled]. (threshold for 
compensation: % ran: 80% for trams and 92% for buses and trains). 
• Speed & delay: Punctuality - on time performance, measured at end of journey for buses 
and trains, trams measured at 4th monitoring point of 5 along route; train or tram on time 
if <59 secs before and <5 min 59 secs after scheduled time; buses <2 min early or 5 mins 
late (threshold for compensation: % on time 95-96%). 
 
Comments: 
 
The franchise agreements and bus contracts, managed by the Director of Public Transport in the 
Department of Infrastructure, set out the overall levels of service required from each operator, 
tickets to be offered, maximum ticket charges and other performance standards. 
 
Delays, cancellations and other service failures are recorded then measured to the nearest 60 
seconds and weighted according to the number of people estimated to be traveling on the tram or 
train in the time period, day of week and direction of travel.  This gives passenger weighted 
minutes of delay, which are checked against performance targets set in the franchise agreements 
and determines whether a bonus or penalty is applicable.  If an operator does not meet minimum 
service level requirements, compensation (usually in the form of complimentary tickets) must be 
provided to customers holding valid periodical tickets of >=4 weeks who traveled on the service 
concerned. If the operator falls below minimum service requirements, provisions in the franchise 
agreements trigger a ‘call in’, in which the operator explains and submits plans to the Director of 
Public transport for improvement. 
 
Monthly surveys of users and non-users are conducted, with respondents rating a number of 
aspects of transit (satisfied to dissatisfied): Service Delivery, Information Services, 
Stations/stops, Passenger comfort, Staff service, Value for money, Ticketing and Personal safety. 
This information is presented for each aspect and also complied into an overall Customer 
Satisfaction Index.  
 
2.4 TRANSPERTH  
Source: Personal Communication with Mr Ian Vinicombe, Transperth, Perth, Western Australia. 
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Transit Systems:  Trains: Westrail, Ferries: Perth Water Transit, Buses: CGEA Connex, 
Southern Coast Transit, Path Transit, Swan Transit.  
Transit Modes Considered: Urban fixed-route bus; commuter rail and ferry. 
Performance Measures Identified: 
• Community-based:  Affordability - Average concession fare as a proportion of the single 
pension per day; Proportion of service km provided by wheelchair-accessible vehicles; 
Proportion of train stations providing unaided access to people in wheelchairs; Passenger 
information (proportion of incoming calls answered); Customer complaints/compliments  
• Comfort & convenience: Bus fleet presentation (the number of instances where the bus or 
the driver does not conform to specified standards). 
• Economics/productivity: Total boardings including transfers; initial boardings (number of 
journeys commencing on each mode and recorded electronically); Initial boardings per 
service km and per capita; cost per 1000 passenger place km; Proportion of the 
Transperth bus fleet conforming to ECE emission standards. 
• Speed & delay: On-time running – proportion of services running within five minutes of 
the scheduled time. 
 
2.5 TRANSPORT, WESTERN AUSTRALIA  
Source: Annual Report 1999-2000, Transport (Western Australia), Perth, Western Australia, 
Australia, 2000.  http://www.dot.wa.gov.au/annualrep/index9900.html 
 
Transit Systems:  public transport operators under Transperth, which is managed by Transport 
(Western Australia) 
Transit Modes Considered: Urban fixed-route bus; commuter rail and ferry. 
Performance Measures Identified:  
• Community-based:  Stakeholder and customer satisfaction survey (telephone survey 
ranking of poor to excellent for aspects of the transit system). 
• Comfort & convenience: Percentage of service kilometres by wheelchair accessible 
vehicles; wheelchair accessible train stations in total number of stations. 
• Service delivery: Transperth bus fleet conforming to ECE emission standards. 
• Service offered/utilization: Total boardings. 
• Economics/productivity: Percentage of household income spent on transport; average 
Concession fare as a proportion of the single pension per day.   
 
Comments: 
 
Performance indicators are divided into the following objectives: integration, safety, 
accessibility, environmental sustainability, efficiency and effective revenue collection. 
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2.6 UITP (INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT) 
Source: Incentive Agreements in Bus Public Transport. UITP (International Association of 
Public Transport), Belgique, http://www.uitp.com, 2000. Main report from a study into the 
incentive agreements between transit operators and authorities in Europe. 
Transit Systems:  bus operators throughout Europe, with case studies of operators in the UK, 
Norway, France, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden. 
Transit Modes Considered: Urban fixed-route bus. 
 
Comments:  
 
The study found that initiatives regarding incentives agreements are only in a limited number of 
countries in Europe: Norway, Sweden, UK, Switzerland, France and Denmark.  The main 
conclusions were: 
 
• As much as possible, the contract should lead to a consistency of the interests of the 
transit authority and those of the operators through a proper distribution of rights and 
responsibilities. 
• A tendered gross-cost contract with incentives based on perceived customer satisfaction 
or tendered net-cost contract with some regulation to ensure fulfillment for the public 
good are both suitable solutions.  The difference between net-cost and gross-cost is which 
party bears the risk, with the risk in net-cost bourn by the operator. 
• It is important to ensure that the contract creates long term self interest in the quality of 
transit on the part of the operators.  If not, tendering will lead to a decreasing quality with 
les patronage in the long term. 
• The specific type of contract should be chosen after careful consideration of the goals of 
the public transport system and should reflect the long-term development of the bus 
operation industry. 
• Renewal of contracts is a crucial issue which has not been satisfactorily resolved. 
 
Incentives used by the various agencies are summarized below. 
 
London, UK 
  
• Cost reductions made by operator are shared between transit authority and operator. 
• Quality indicators, punctuality, performance etc, are used in the evaluation of new bids 
• Cancelled journeys create financial sanctions. 
• Three warnings with a year or persistence failure causes the cancellation of the contract. 
 
Manchester, UK 
 
• Point System: 5-50 points for each non-fulfillment, including bus standard, cleanliness, 
comfort, punctuality, reliability and conduct of drivers. 
• More than 100 points per year causes cancellation of contract. 
• Penalties, either cancellation of contract or accumulating penalty points for cancelled 
journeys.  
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Oslo, Norway 
  
• Previously used efficiency agreements, since 1998 quality incentives with bonus and 
penalties (for cancelled journeys and regularity). 
• Operator receives a percentage of revenue, a cash payment paid on buses and a fixed 
subsidy (which declines each year due to improved efficiency). 
 
Oppland, Norway 
 
• Quality: bonus of 2% maximum related to passenger survey, with penalties for poor 
performance. 
• Revenue: Passengers increase 5% or 6% generate 1% or 2% bonus respectively 
• Negotiated: 
• Revenue: additional revenue above a certain level is divided between transit authority and 
operator. 
• Efficiency: fixed cost reduction set each year. 
• Quality incentive: bonus of 2% maximum related to passenger survey, with penalties for 
poor performance. 
 
Malmo, Sweeden 
 
• Quality: based on passenger survey according to 5 quality indicators. 
• Bonus if every indicator is above a certain level, to a maximum of 5% of revenue.  
Penalties: maximum 2.5% of costs. 
• Quality incentives: prolongation of contracts up to 2 years if performance sufficient. 
• Revenue/Passenger Incentive: bonus and penalties that are percentages of the revenue 
generated. 
 
Gothenburg, Sweden 
  
• Revenue Incentive of 25% generated in operator vehicles (electronic ticketing). 
• Environmental Incentive: bonuses when buses have pollution levels less than those 
stipulated in the contract. 
• Non fulfillment of contract causes cancellation of contract after a number of warnings. 
 
Helsingborg, Sweden  
 
• Threatened Competition: in the case of low performance (quality, patronage etc) new 
operators are likely to take over. No new tendering rounds are automatically enforced. 
• Quality Incentive: passenger surveys, with quality below certain levels during three 
periods causing cancellation of contract and no bonuses or penalties. 
• Termination of contract in the case of continuously decreasing patronage. 
• Minor restrictions on bus production, service, fares, passenger increase, quality and 
common elaboration of traffic/market plan. 
 
    Transit Contracts: Performance Measures 
    
QUT Transport Research Consortium 11 
  
Zurich, Switzerland 
   
• Total budget achieved, bonus to operators. 
• Incentive pool of 2% of contracted cost, depending on general situation of bus transport 
and individual success of operator, with the pool increasing with the number of bus 
operators. 
• Maximum part of pool is based on market share and score on quality index (based on 
passenger questionnaires regarding punctuality and service). 
 
Copenhagen, Denmark 
 
• Quality incentive: up to 5% bonus for good performance with penalties for poor quality 
to maximum of 1% of contract amount. 
• Penalties for cancelled journeys and breaches of contract. 
• Non fulfillment of contract causes cancellation of contract after a number of warnings. 
 
Lille, France 
 
• Quality incentive: penalties for non fulfillment of quality incentives based on the degree 
of contractual non fulfillment. 
• Revenue/Patronage Incentive: Bonus for output exceeding transport objective else 
penalties applied. 
 
Lyon, France 
 
• Quality incentive: penalties if a number of quality indicators not filled. 
• Revenue/patronage incentive: Bonus for output exceeding transport objective or else 
penalties are applied. 
• 60% of all routes must be certified by 2004 in a national standard system. 
 
2.7 REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION OF NEVADA  
Source: Contract for Citizens Area Transit System: Fixed Route Transit Services. Regional 
Transportation Commission (RTC), Las Vegas, Nevada, US.  
Transit Systems:  Bus Service Operators 
Transit Modes Considered: Urban fixed-route bus 
Performance Measures Identified: (minimum levels) 
 
• Community-based:  number of complaints (maximum 10 complaints per 1000 
passengers). 
• Transit availability: percentage revenue vehicles available for service at all times (80%) 
• Service offered/utilization: trip completion: incomplete if: 
o  started more than 20 minutes late; 
o entire run 30 minutes late; 
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o service not operated; 
o misses a stop or does not complete run (99%). 
• Economics/productivity: Farebox revenue. 
• Speed & delay:  on time performance: with on time defined as zero minutes early and no 
more than 10 minutes late (95%). 
Comments:    
 
Revenue incentive: operator receives 35% of amount that actual farebox revenues exceeds a base 
daily revenue for a given section. Penalties imposed for not meeting the minimum (or maximum) 
levels for all the performance measures listed above. 
 
2.8 STRATEGIC RAIL AUTHORITY, UK 
Sources: (a)On Track, Edition 3 (15 Oct - 31 March 2001).  
Strategic Rail Authority, UK, http://www.sra.gov.uk/sra/ontrack/Default.htm, June 2001. Public 
Information on the UK Rail Operators performance; 
(b) Source: Quarterly Bulletin, Edition 3 (17 Oct 1999 – 8 Jan 2000). Strategic Rail Authority, UK, 
http://www.sra.gov.uk, March, 2000. Public information on the UK rail operators performance.  
 
Transit Systems:  25 train operating companies (TOCs) in the UK. 
Transit Modes Considered: Commuter rail. 
Performance Measures Identified: 
 
• Community-based:  National passenger survey on 12 aspects of train travel; complaints 
per 100,000 passenger journeys; response to complaints within target and within 20 
working days; actions to improve service to customers (outside franchise agreement). 
• Economics/productivity: the incentive payments/penalties for each TOC (based on 
punctuality, short formations, timetable changes – see comments below for more details); 
subsidy per passenger mile. 
• Speed & delay: Percentage of trains 0-5 mins late (includes early trains), 5-10 mins, 10-
15 mins, 15-20, over 20 and cancelled (if run less than half of route) – measured at final 
destination. 
 
Comments:  
 
There are 3 types of incentive payments/penalties for each TOC.  One is based on punctuality in 
which lateness and cancellations are compared to the benchmark figure, (which is the annual 
performance in the pre-franchise period in most cases), if the performance is better than the 
benchmark, the SRA pays the operator, else the operator pays the SRA.  Short formation 
incentive payments apply to peak services in London and some other cites based on cancellation 
changes to the train plan showing the capacity to be delivered.  Timetable change incentive 
payments penalise operators who change the timetable from the printed version.  
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Passenger complaints data divided into a number of categories: train service performance; fares, 
retailing and refunds; quality on train; information at station and on trains; complaints handling; 
staff conduct and availability; station quality; other; safety and security; NRES; timetable and 
connection issues; special needs; and praise comments. 
 
National passenger survey divided into the following aspects: 
 
1. Overall satisfaction with the journey 
2. Trains arrive and depart on time 
3. Frequency of trains 
4. Price/value for money of tickets 
5. Information provided at stations about trains times/platforms 
6. Upkeep and repair of the train 
7. Speed of the journey 
8. Having a seat 
9. Train connections 
10. Comfort of the seating area 
11. being able to buy a ticket easily and quickly 
12. Providing an appropriate environment for people to catch their train 
13. Provision of information if there are any delays 
14. Passengers concerns with personal security 
15. Satisfaction with the way in which any recent complaints or claims made for compensation 
were handled. 
 
Each route group is assigned a grade for punctuality, another for reliability, and an overall grade 
which is the lower of the two [see Table for grades]. Whole operator performance is graded in 
the same way by aggregating performance across the total number of that operator’s trains which 
are covered by the charter.  Some route groups are excluded from the grading tables as they 
operate to tighter punctuality standards than the other route groups. 
 
Grade  % Punctuality % Reliability 
A 95 to 100 99.5 to 100 
B 90 to 94.9 99 to 99.4 
C 85 to 89.9 98.5 to 98.9 
D 80 to 84.9 98 to 98.4 
E 79.9 or less 97.9 or less 
 
Generally, statistics are based on all trains from Monday to Saturday. However, some London 
commuter operators measure all trains Monday to Friday, and there are other exceptions. The 
franchise agreements require that all operators must carry out at least one customer satisfaction 
survey every six months. 
 
 
 
    Transit Contracts: Performance Measures 
    
QUT Transport Research Consortium 14 
  
2.9 TAS PARTNERSHIP LIMITED  
Source: Quality Bus Partnerships QBP) - Good Practice Guide, TAS Partnership Limited; Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, UK.  http://www.tas-passtrans.co.uk/qbp-gpg.htm, 2001. 
Developed to assist local authorities and bus operators in implementing Quality Bus Partnerships. The 
guide is being produced and published by TAS, but has been written on behalf of and approved by the 
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, UK. 
Transit Systems:  bus operators. 
Transit Modes Considered: Urban fixed-route bus. 
 
Comments:   
 
Monitoring of QBPs should be conducted to: 
 
• determine when, whether, or by what degree the objectives of the QBP have been met; 
• demonstrate to partners that the QBP process is, or is not, likely to deliver its objectives 
at intervals during the process;  
• demonstrate the impact of the QBP on other objectives and policies; 
• develop or alter the strategy, or the mix of components adopted following the 
implementation of a scheme, but prior to the development of further schemes.  
 
Monitoring seeks constantly to test that the resources being applied to the QBP by the partners 
are delivering the objectives envisaged.  Items to be monitored should directly relate to one of 
three categories: 
 
• QBP's objectives - this in turn should dictate that targets are monitored;  
• impact of the QBP on other objectives and policies;  
• performance of individual components within QBP schemes.  
 
Individual items to be monitored should represent the best balance of:  
 
• those items which best determine outcomes;  
• those items which are easiest to determine (require the lowest level of additional 
resources);  
• the extent to which partners need to monitor, why should monitoring be conducted. 
 
Partners should therefore seek to make the best use of data they already collect. This might 
include: 
 
• electronic ticket machine data (for monitoring patronage, revenue and indicative 
journey time changes); 
• local authority traffic counts (for an indication of reduction of non-bus trips - changes 
to mode split which might indicate a mode shift). Traffic counts are only likely to be 
appropriate for a large scheme (probably with a spend greater than £5m) where 
significant changes are anticipated. 
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Normally, additional surveys will need to be undertaken. Monitoring should be conducted jointly 
by all partners, with information and results shared. Protocols for data sharing between partners 
must be agreed before the start of monitoring. 
 
2.10 INCENTIVE CONTRACTS IN NORWEGIAN LOCAL PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
Source: The Hordaland Model, Carlquist, E. (2001). Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo, 
2001 
Transit Systems Evaluated:  3 bus operators in Hordaland, Norway.  
Transit Modes Considered: Urban fixed-route bus. 
 
Comments: 
 
The performance based incentive contracts implemented in Hordaland, Norway for bus operators 
in the year 2000 is described in this paper.  From focusing very strongly on cost reductions, the 
operator is becoming more market oriented. The year 2000 was a transitional phase, with only 
some elements of the performance contract being implemented.  For example, a patronage-based 
incentive component initially suggested by the Institute of Transport Economics, was not 
implemewnted. The bonus system should be initiated in 2001, based on customer satisfaction 
(30%), reliability (10%), punctuality (10%) and passenger trips (50%).   
 
In the contract suggested by the Institute of Transport Economics, the entire subsidy amount was 
to be performance-based, with specified rates for subsidies per route kilometre, vehicle hour for 
peak hours and off-peak, and an additional amount per passenger in peak hours. These rates 
would vary among the operators, depending on the proportion of urban versus rural mileage, 
with a ceiling for the total amount. 
 
The authorities define a framework for the minimum quality of service, with regard to fares and 
accessibility. In the suggested contract, if customer satisfaction falls below 90 % of the target 
level, based on a customer satisfaction survey, the authority can put the contract out for tender. 
 
Using the assumption of only one performance item for simplicity (the Hordaland model has 
three), actual vehicle kilometres produced (VKM) and one rate (RATE), i.e. Norwegian Kroner 
per vehicle kilometre. The subsidy is subject to budgetary constraints, and thus cannot exceed a 
predetermined level. A fixed deduction (FD) is defined in the base year (2000) and is subtracted 
to yield the subsidy (S), giving: 
 
 St = (RATE * VKMt) – FD 
 
The estimated subsidy for year 2000 is given by: 
 
 S2000 = (RATE * VKM2000) – FD 
 
As year 2000 is the starting point of the contract, the fixed deduction for the subsequent years 
(FD’) depends on the actual mileage level in 2000: 
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FD’ = (RATE * VKM2000) – S2000.   
 
Therefore, the subsidy for 2001 is a function of vehicle kilometres produced:  
 
S2001 = (RATE * VKM2001) – FD’ 
 
Not only ticket revenues, but also the subsidy level, depends on performance, i.e. vehicle 
kilometres in this simplified example.  Therefore the profits (π) are co-determined by different 
performance-based factors, namely ticket revenues (I), subsidies (S) and costs (C). Ticket 
revenue is the product of fares (P) and demand (X), and demand is a function of vehicle 
kilometres (mileage production) and fares.  
 
 π = I + S – C 
 
 where  C =f(VKM, …) and I = P*X and X = g(VKM, P, …).  Given the “right” incentive 
(RATE), the operator will decide on a fare level (P) and production (VKM) at a level which 
maximises profits and maximises social welfare, given the budgetary constraints of the county 
council. 
 
2.11 KCRC (KOWLOON-CANTON RAILWAY CORPORATION) 
Source: Public Information Documents and Personnel Communication with Dr Siu Lok Kee, 
New Technology and Systems Planning Manager, Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation (KCR), 
Hong Kong 
Transit Systems:  Commuter rail. 
 
Comments: 
 
KCR has two main operating Divisions, namely: 
 
• KCR East Rail which carried 800,000 passengers perday in 2000 ( links Hong Kong with 
Mainland China and also serves the New Territories within Hong Kong); and 
 
• KCR Light Rail operating in the North West New Territories  (32 kms; 57 stops and 
320,000 passengers per day in 2000. Some bus services are also run in conjunction with 
light rail services. 
 
KCR publishes separate targets for the two operations, as well as the performance measures 
achieved in the previous year. 
 
Tables 1,2 and 3 reflect performance and targets for 2000. 
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Table 1: KCR 2000 Performance and Targets – Light Rail (2000) 
 
Performance Measure Target Actual 
Performance 
(2000) 
Service delivery 99% 99.9% 
Punctuality 99% 99.39% 
Service reliability: Kms run per failure 
 
> > 80000 89300 
Service reliability: time affected by failure  < 35 mins. 19.07 mins. 
Availability of ticket vending machines 99% 99.86% 
Availability of Octopus equipment (smart cards) 99% 99.97% 
Cleanliness: inside cleaned daily 99% 100% 
Cleanliness: outside cleaned every 2 days 99% 100% 
Cleanliness: Platform cleaned daily 99% 100% 
No. service disruption over 20 mins. Minimal 1 
Passengers/public injured per million pass. Carried Minimal 0.23 
   
Response to passenger enquiries   
   
Phone (within 2 working days) 99% 100% 
Letter (within 6 working days) 99% 100% 
 
 
Table 2: KCR 2000 Performance and Targets – Bus Services (2000) 
 
Performance Measure Target Actual 
Performance 
(2000) 
Service delivery 99% 99.29% 
Service reliability: Kms run per failure 
 
> > 65000 90400 
Cleanliness: inside cleaned daily 99% 100% 
Cleanliness: outside cleaned daily 99% 100% 
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Table 3: KCR 2000 Performance and Targets – East Rail (2000) 
 
Performance Measure Target Actual 
Performance 
(2000) 
Service delivery 99% 99.9% 
Punctuality 99% 99.6% 
Availability of ticket vending machines 99% 99.6% 
Availability of train information displays 99% 100% 
Availability of add value machines 99% 99.8% 
Availability of enquiry processors 99% 100% 
Availability of first class processors 99% 100% 
Availability of fare collection gates 99% 99.9% 
Availability of escalators 99% 99.9% 
Cleanliness: external train washing 99% 99.6% 
No. service disruption over 20 mins. (p.a.) Minimal 4 
On-train air-conditioning failures per month < 3 2.5 
   
Response to passenger enquiries   
   
Phone (within 2 working days) 99% 100% 
Letter (within 6 working days) 99% 100% 
 
2.12 SOUTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT  
Source: Contract Documents for Provision of Public Transport Services; South Africa 
Department of Transport, South Africa. 
Transit Systems:  bus operators. 
Transit Modes: Urban fixed-route bus.   
Performance Measures Identified: 
 
• Comfort & convenience: Failing to display correct destinations, correct duty boards or to 
display any destinations or duty; failing to pick up or set down passengers at authorised 
stops; vehicles in an unsatisfactory condition; Deviating from routes. 
• Service delivery: Vehicle breakdowns.  
• Economics/productivity: Number of passengers using cash tickets; number of passengers 
using multi-journey tickets; total passenger trips; total income cash; total MJT income; 
total income from ticket sales. 
• Speed & delay: trips that depart late or early; failing to provide specified trips. 
 
Action which incur penalties are described in Table 4.  Note that ‘the amount that the Employer 
would have paid for the trip concerned’ is called Employer Cost.  
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Table 4. Penalties Incurred: South Africa 
 
Action Penalty 
Failing to provide specified trips 40% Employer Cost, revenue kilometres not paid. 
Providing trips that depart late or early 
• between 6 and 15 minutes late from 
the departure point. 
• > 15 minutes late from the departure 
point or any transfer point 
• > 30 minutes late from the departure 
point or any transfer point 
early. 
 
• 25% Employer Cost, revenue kilometres will be 
paid. 
• 40% Employer Cost, revenue kilometres will be 
paid. 
• the trip will be deemed not to have been 
operated, no penalty or revenue kilometres 40% 
Employer Cost, revenue kilometres will be paid. 
Vehicle breakdowns  
If the Operator does not provide a replacement 
vehicle for breakdowns (i) at the starting point 
of a route or within an 8 kilometre radius 
within 30 minutes; (ii) else within 45 minutes. 
Replacement vehicle not within required time: 40% 
Employer Cost, revenue kilometres will be paid.  No 
replacement vehicle provided, penalties will be imposed 
for a trip not provided. >2% vehicle breakdowns per 
month incur R200,00 per breakdown over 2%.   
Failing to display  
• correct destinations  
• correct duty boards  
• to display any destinations or duty 
boards at all 
 
R200,00 
R60,00 
2 weekdays to remedy the situation, whereafter a 
R200,00 per bus per day. 
Failing to pick up or set down passengers at 
authorised stops 
R60,00 except capacity of the vehicle would have been 
exceeded. 
Vehicles in an unsatisfactory condition 
 
• dirty on the outside or inside  
• not in a good state of repair or with a 
leaking roof, broken windows or in an 
unhygienic  
• missing, broken or wet seats  
• broken or missing doors 
2 weekdays to remedy (except dirty buses) >14 days, 
withdraw the bus. 
R30,00 per bus  
R120,00 per bus  
 
 
R30,00 per bus 
R120.00 per bus 
Deviating from routes R100,00, approved revenue kilometres paid. 
Failing to provide the right type, quality and 
age of vehicles 
5% of the total amount payable of the relevant month's 
payment certificate will be withheld on a pro rata basis.  
Non compliance 3 months from the date that the monies 
were withheld, forfeit monies. 
Failing to install or to have operational EE 
and failing to provide specified information 
failure to complete stages within the time, 3% of the 
gross certificate value payable, withheld for 3 months 
then forfeited. 
Failing to implement the “RD-Proposal” 3% of the gross certificate value payable, withheld for 3 
months then forfeited. 
Failing to subcontract 
• within specified time 
• 1 year 
 
 
5% of the gross certificate value payable,  
10% of the gross certificate value payable, 
withheld for 3 months then forfeited. 
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3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This report has summarised the work undertaken at QUT as part of a research project sponsored 
by the Federal Transit Administration in the US. The project was administered by the US 
Transportation Research Board of the National Research Council, under TCRP Project G-6. 
Kittelson and Associates Inc. acted as the principal investigators and other participants included 
Urbitran Inc., LKC Consulting Services, MORPACE International, Inc. and Yuko Nakanishi.  
 
As well as an extensive literature review, a total of 19 transit planning agencies and operators 
were interviewed regarding the performance measures currently in use. The results are available 
in the form of several project reports, which are currently in draft form, including: 
 
• TCRP G-6: A guidebook for developing a transit performance measurement system: 
Literature Review, September 2001;  
• TCRP G-6: A guidebook for developing a transit performance measurement system: 
Interim Report, December 2001; and 
• TCRP G-6: A guidebook for developing a transit performance measurement system: 
Performance measure summary, December 2001. 
All reports can be viewed from the following website: www.Kittelson.com 
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